Long Discourses: The Section on Ethics
ฉบับแปลอังกฤษ · Volume 9 · Page 240
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Doesn’t what they say turn out to have no demonstrable basis?” “Clearly that’s the case, sir.”

“Suppose a man was to build a ladder at the crossroads for climbing up to a stilt longhouse. They’d say to him, My friend, that stilt longhouse for which you’re building a ladder—do you know whether it’s to the north, south, east, or west? Or whether it’s tall or short or medium?’ Asked this, he’d say, ‘No.’ They’d say to him, ‘My man, are you building a ladder for a longhouse that you’ve never even known or seen?’ Asked this, he’d say, ‘Yes.’ What do you think, Poṭṭhapāda? This being so, doesn’t that man’s statement turn out to have no demonstrable basis?” “Clearly that’s the case, sir.”

“In the same way, the ascetics and brahmins who have those various doctrines and views … Doesn’t what they say turn out to have no demonstrable basis?” “Clearly that’s the case, sir.”

2.2. Three Kinds of Incarnation “Poṭṭhapāda, there are these three kinds of incarnation: a solid incarnation, a mind-made incarnation, and a formless incarnation. And what is a solid incarnation? It is formed, made up of the four principal states, and consumes edible food. What is a mind-made incarnation? It is formed, mind-made, whole in its major and minor limbs, not deficient in any faculty. What is a formless incarnation? It is formless, made of perception.

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